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1 Introduction
Increasing research activity has recently focused on the e¤ects of uncertainty
in the conduct of monetary policy. Whereas the traditional literature dealt
with uncertainty by adding exogenous disturbances to a linear-quadratic eco-
nomic framework, which guarantees that the certainty equivalence holds true, a
more interesting kind of uncertainty faced by central bankers, known as model
uncertainty, is progressively attracting the interest of scholars.
In Brainards (1967) classic analysis, model uncertainty, understood in the
sense that the marginal e¤ect of a policy instrument on a macroeconomic out-
come is described by a parameter distribution, leads to cautious policy. This
result has been recently challenged by a body of research investigating how mon-
etary policy should be conducted when the central bank knows the structural
relations of the economy (the reference model), but she faces uncertainty about
the value of the parameters or about the stochastic structure of the model. This
problem has been tackled using robust control techniques: a min-maximizing
central bank, aiming to avoid poor performances associated to unfortunate
parameter congurations, derives robust monetary policy rules under the worst
possible specication (the worst case model, or scenario). In Dynamic Stochas-
tic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, with monopolistic competitive produc-
ers experiencing frictions in price setting which cause monetary non-neutrality
(i.e., the New Keynesian approach), this behavior leads, in general to an anti-
attenuation result (i.e., the policy-maker reacts more vigorously to shocks), but
this conclusion not always applies.
The anti-attenuation result typically emerges in closed economies where un-
certainty is modelled through a set of additive perturbations controlled by a
ctitious evil agentwho tries to maximize the central banks loss by setting
a specication error of bounded size (i.e., the unstructured model uncertainty
proposed by Hansen and Sargent, HS, 2004), whereas the opposite may occur
in open economies (Leitemo and Söderström, 2004a; 2004b). In any case, the
optimal trade-o¤ between targets is not a¤ected by the preference for robust-
ness (i.e., Walshs (2004) equivalence result). Yet, even if the desired trade-o¤
is the same, target variables turn out to be more volatile. The same non uni-
vocal conclusions are reached in forward looking New Keynesian models under
parameter uncertainty where, di¤erently from HS, the evil agent controls one or
more coe¢ cients of the structural equations (Giannoni, 2002). In such a con-
text, the robust policy may require to react more or less strongly than in the
certainty-equivalence environment to uctuations in ination and in the out-
put gap according to the assumptions which are made on the central banks
objective function or on the parameter which is subject to uncertainty (Kara,
2002). Min-max policy prescriptions are hence fragile with respect to changes
in the description of the economy, starting from the very characterization of
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uncertainty.
This conclusion provides a strong motivation to analyze the behavior of a
central bank under strong (Knightian) uncertainty when the short run trade-
o¤between output and ination is represented by the Sticky Information Phillips
Curve (SIPC) recently proposed by Mankiw and Reis (MR, 2002). By solving
the robust control problem analytically, this paper shows how and why the
robust monetary policy in this economy di¤ers from the optimal one identied
by Ball, Mankiw and Reis (BMR, 2005).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we summarize the BMRs
(2005) model, highlighting the optimality of a price targeting rule.
In section 3 we compute the robust policy under the unstructured approach.
In line with most of the literature1 , if the central bank and the evil agent act
simultaneously, in the worst case model targets variability increase with the pref-
erence for robustness. When the policy maker employs this robust instrument
rule but the actual misspecication is zero (the approximated model solution),
an anti-attenuation result obtains: the policy maker varies his instrument more
vigorously than he would in the certainly equivalent case. This over-reaction
produces a greater or smaller stabilization of the price level depending on the
value of the desired trade-o¤ in the rational expectation model. When in this
model the policy maker reacts to the cost shock by injecting (mopping up)
money, in the approximated model he reacts by injecting (mopping up) even
more money. Thus, whereas in sticky price economies, where it is optimal to
target ination, the central bank never reacts to a cost shock by producing a
price deation, this may well happen in a sticky information economy under a
price targeting regime. If the central bank acts as a Stackelberg leader with
respect to the evil agent, the Walsh equivalence result is no longer valid: the
policy maker is less aggressive in the stabilization of the price level. The macro-
economic consequences of this behavior in the approximating model solutions
are driven by the interaction of two forces which may operate in opposite di-
rections: the rst one is the anti-attenuation e¤ect in the use of the nominal
policy instrument (the same at play under the Nash timing); the second one is
due to the new desired trade-o¤ that favours output stabilization. We conclude
the section by tackling the issue of the optimal design of institutions, i.e., the
central banks degree of conservativeness that maximizes social welfare.
Section 4 derives the robust policies according to Giannonis parametric
approach and shows that, also in this case, the central bank seeks to stabilize
the price level less than in the model without parameter uncertainty.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Ball Mankiw Reis model
MR (2002) propose a relation between output and ination based on the sticky
information hypotheses. The SIPC is based on the idea that symmetric mo-
nopolistically competitive rms choose their optimal price in each period, but
1See Walsh (2004), and Leitemo and Söderström (2004a)
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the information set they use when solving the prot maximization problem may
not be the current one. Information is sticky in the sense that rms update it
sporadically. The process that guides information gathering is similar to that
formulated by Calvo (1983) for price adjustment: In the latter model, in each
period, only a fraction (1   !) of rms can adjust their prices; in the former
model in each period only a fraction (1   !) of rm obtains a new informa-
tion set, while the remaining ! continue to x prices on the basis of the old
one. The log-linearization of the rst order conditions of the consumersand
the producersoptimization problem yields the Phillips curve and the price level
equations2 :
t =
(1  !)
!
[xt + ut] + (1  !)
1X
k=0
!kEt 1 k (t + xt +ut) (1)
pt = (1  !)
1X
k=0
!kEt k (pt + xt + ut) (2)
Ination (t) depends on the current output gap (bxt) and the cost push shock
(ut), the past expectations on current ination, the growth of the output gap
and the shock.  is a combination of fundamental parameters which represents
the sensitivity of rms optimal price to the expected deviation of output. The
price level depends both on current and past expectations on the output gap
and the cost push shock3 .
As MR (2002) and BMR (2005) assume, the demand side of the economy is
represented by a quantity theory equation:
xt = mt   pt (3)
where mt is the log of the money supply. The policy instrument for period t
is chosen at time t   1, before the realization of ut; the policy decisions hence
a¤ect the economy with a lag.
As for the welfare function, BMR dene the current period welfare as the
average level of utility across all households. A second-order approximation of
householdsloss is found to be a function of the variability of output around its
exible price level and of the cross-sectional variability of output across di¤erent
rms (Woodford, 2003):
wt = w (V ar (xt) ; V arj (yjt   yt))
As the natural output di¤ers from e¢ cient output only by a constant inde-
pendent of policy, the variability of output around the natural level measures
the variability around e¢ cient output. The cross-sectional variability of output
across di¤erent rms enters the loss function since variability at the rm level is
2For a complete derivation of the SIPC see, among others, Khan and Zhu (2002) and
Tranbandt (2003).
3BMR consider also productivity and demand shocks, but we omitt these for simplicity.
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ine¢ cient because it creates variability in the labor supply around the e¢ cient
level. Following Woodford (2003), the period loss can be formally written as:
wt = V ar (xt) + bE [V arj (pjt   pt)] +K+ k ? k (4)
where b is a combination of fundamental parameters and K collects the terms
independent of policy (for the sake of simplicity, we set K = 0). In equation 4,
we have used:
V arj (yjt   yt) = 2V arj (pjt   pt)
to replace the cross-sectional variability of output across di¤erent rms with the
price variability,  is the elasticity of demand.
Since V arj (pjt   pt) =
P1
j=1 f (!; j) (pt+k   Et+k jpt+k)2 4 ;the central bank
thus attempts to minimize:
Wt =
1X
k=0
kwt+k =
1X
k=0
kx2t+k + b
1X
j=1
f (!; j) (pt+k   Et+k jpt+k)2 (5)
where f (!; j) = (1 !)!
j
(1 !j)(1 !j+1) .
Equation (5) shows that the terms in the loss function depend on aggre-
gate variables. Under sticky information, social welfare departs from the com-
mon micro-founded representation derived under sticky prices, where the cross-
sectional variability of prices is determined by the current and lagged values of
squared ination (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003).
2.1 Optimal monetary policy in BMR
The optimal policy can be found by minimizing the loss function (5) with respect
to the policy instrument subject to the demand side and the supply side of the
model. BMR show that by combining equations (2) and (3) it is possible to
determine a linear relation between pt and the money supply target mt. Since
mt is determined one period in advance and the shocks are unforecastable, there
exists a linear relation between the money supply target and the expectation
at time t   1 (when the policy instrument is set) of the price level at time t
(Et 1pt). Hence we can interpret Et 1ptas the policy instrument.
The general moving average, MA(1), representation of the price level and
the output equilibrium paths are, respectively, pt =
P1
j=0 jt j and x^t =P1
j=0 'jt j , where t are the innovations of the model; j and 'j are unknown
coe¢ cients. Because of the lag in the policy transmission mechanism the robust
policy process is given by Et 1pt =
P1
j=1 jt j and Et 1xt =
P1
j=1 'jt j .
Given the equation for the price level:
pt = (1  !)
1X
k=0
!kEt k (pt + axt + ut)
4 see BMR (2005) for technical details.
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where ut =
P1
j=0 jt j is an arbitrary stationary process, the price level can
be rewritten as:
1X
j=1
jt j =
1X
j=1
j
 
jt j + a'jt j + jt j

where j = (1  !)Pjk=0 !k.
Since this expression must hold for all possible realizations of t j , it follows
that:
'j =
1
a

1  j
j
j   j

(6)
Since pt   Et ipt =
Pi 1
j=0 jt j , we can write the objective function as:
L =
24 1X
j=1
'2j + b
1X
i=1

1
i 1
  1
i
 i 1X
j=1
2j
352 : (7)
By minimizing (7) with respect to j subject to (6), we obtain the optimal
coe¢ cients:
j =
1
a2b+ 1 jj
j for j > 0 (8)
and thus:
'j =  
ab
a2b+ 1 jj
j for j > 0 (9)
given the lag in the policy transmission mechanism the central bank cannot
reply contemporaneously to the shock, hence in period t = 0 the price and the
output coe¢ cients are given by:
0 =
1  !
1  (1  !) (1  a) and '0 =  0
The relation between the optimal coe¢ cients is given by:
'j =  abj (10)
which implies the following targeting rule:
Et 1pt = kt   1
ab
Et 1xt (11)
where kt can be any deterministic path. As stressed by Hall (1984) and BMR
(2005), optimal policy can be described as an elastic price standard, i.e. the
central bank allows the price level to deviate from its target when output de-
viates from its natural rate. To understand this result, consider a cost push
shock at time t = 0. Since policy responds with a lag, the informed rms im-
mediately rise their prices and the aggregate price level increases. Consider an
auto-correlated shock. In the following period the uninformed rms continue to
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set prices at zero, but for the informed rms policy now produces its e¤ect and
induces them to set prices according to the optimal trade-o¤ (11). As long as
the shock persists the central bank allows output and the price level to deviate
from their targets. When the shock vanishes all rms set the same zero price,
whereas, under ination targeting, in order to avoid disination, the central
bank must induce the informed rms to set positive prices. This would cause
output variability, since informed and uninformed rms are still setting di¤erent
prices.
The desired targets trade-o¤ is implemented through the following instru-
ment rule in MA(1)representation:
mt =
1X
j=1
j t j
where the coe¢ cients rnj are given by:
j = 

j + '

j =
1  ab
a2b+ 1 jj
j (12)
For the purpose of our analysis it is important to highlight that the optimal
policy predicts a trade-o¤ between the target variables that can be implemented
though either an increase or a reduction in the nominal policy instrument de-
pending on the value of b. If b < 1, in front of a cost shock the policy
maker reacts by increasing the nominal money supply because the desired tar-
gets trade-o¤ implies that an increase in the price level requires a less than
proportional decrease in the output gap. By contrast if b > 1, the optimal
trade-o¤ predicts a more than proportional decrease in the output gap which,
in its turn, implies a negative response of the nominal money supply. Under
an ination targeting regime such a policy behavior is sub-optimal, as ination
stabilization never requires a decrease in the price level.
3 TheUnstructured model uncertainty approach
3.1 The Nash timing
In this section we apply the HS (2004) robust control techniques to the New-
Keynesian model with sticky information summarized in the previous section.
The unstructured model uncertainty approach conceives the specication errors
as a serially correlated shock process stemming from omitted variables in the
structural model of the economy. These shocks are assumed to be of bounded
size, which can be viewed as a measure of the central banks preference for
robustness. The lack of a prior distribution for the shock process and the pref-
erence for robustness induce the policy maker to adopt a min-max strategy
which can be represented through a "mind" game played by the central bank
and a ctitious "evil agent", who represents the policy makers fear concerning
specication errors. The "evil agent" chooses the amount of misspecication so
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as to maximize the central bank loss. In this subsection we assume that the
two players act simultaneously while in the following subsection we analyze the
Stackelberg equilibrium.
In order to model parameter uncertainty, we introduce in the price equation
(2) a second source of disturbance denoted by zt, which is added to the standard
cost push shock ut in the central banks reference model.
Thus, the misspecicated price equation becomes:
pt = (1  !)
1X
k=0
!kEt k (pt + xt + ut + zt) (13)
Similarly to the other variables, the general MA(1) representation for the
"optimal misspecication" chosen by the evil agent can be written as zt =P1
j=1 jt j , with j unknown coe¢ cients. By substituting it in the price level
equation we get:
1X
j=1
jt j =
1X
j=1
j

jt j + a'jt j  
 
jt j + jt j

(14)
Since this expression must hold for all possible realizations of t j , it follows
that:
'j =
1
a

1  j
j
j   j   j

(15)
Since pt   Et ipt is still given by
Pi 1
j=0 jt j , we can rewrite the cost
function as:
Lr =
24 1X
j=1
'2j + b
1X
i=1

1
i 1
  1
i
 i 1X
j=0
2j
352   1X
j=1
2j
2
 :
where  represents the preference for robustness, or equivalently the set of mod-
els available to the evil agent against which the policy maker wants to be robust.
When the degree of misspecication goes to zero,  goes to innity and we turn
to the standard rational expectations model. An increase in the preference for
robustness means a decrease in 5 .
By minimizing the new objective function subject to equation (15) we obtain:
j =
1
a2b+ 1 jj
 
j + j

(16)
and thus:
'j =  
ab
a2b+ 1 jj
 
j + j

(17)
5See Hansen and Sargent (2004), Giordani and Soderlind (2004), and Leitmo and Soder-
strom (2004)
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Even if j is still undetermined, at this stage we can note that the relation
between the output and the price level coe¢ cients is given by:
'j =  abj (18)
Hence, the optimal price-output trade-o¤ is not a¤ected by the preference
for robustness, that is, the robust optimal targeting rule is the same as the
optimal rule without fear of specication errors. This is the equivalence result
derived by Walsh (2004) in sticky price New-Keynesian models.
The optimal amount of misspecication is obtained by maximizing the loss
function with respect to j , subject to equation (15):
j =  
1 j
j
a2   1j +
1
a2   1j
By substituting equation (16) into the one above, we get:
rnj =
b


a2b+ 1 jj

  b
j (19)
the amount of misspecication is increasing in the central banks preference for
robustness (), and it is negatively related to a, which captures the sensitivity
of rmsoptimal price to the expected deviation of output (when a decreases,
larger movements in output are needed to a¤ect ination). As for parameter
b (i.e., the weight associated to price variability in the loss function) we have
@rnj
@b > 0; this means that when o¤setting relative price variability becomes
more costly the amount of misspecication increases.
By substituting equation (19) in equations (16) and (17) we obtain the price
and the output coe¢ cients in the worst case scenario:
rnj =
1
a2b+ 1 jj   b
j (20)
'rnj =  
ab
a2b+ 1 jj   b
j (21)
When  ! 1, rnj and 'rnj collapse to the optimal coe¢ cients in the ab-
sence of model misspecication (see equations (8) and (9)). When the fear of
misspecication is very low (i.e.,  close to innity) rnj > 0 and '
rn
j < 0: a
cost push shock increases ination and decreases output. When  is so small
that rnj and '
rn
j have opposite signs, the policy maker faces a quite unrealistic
situation, as a cost push shock would cause deationary pressure. This is why,
following most of the literature, we focus on small degrees of misspecication6 .
6See Leitemo and Söderström (2004), and Giordani and Soderlind (2004).
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 = a 2 is the cut-o¤ value below which the model predicts unreasonable im-
pulse responses. The relations between the misspecication, and the output and
price coe¢ cients are respectively:
rnj
'rnj
=   1
a
(22)
rnj
rnj
=
b

(23)
Moreover we can note that:
@
'rnj 
@
< 0
@rnj
@
< 0
thus, in line with standard results, both the price level and the output gap
are more volatile in the worst case scenario, when the preference for robustness
increases.
Remember that the analytical solutions in the worst case model are derived
by assuming that the central banks worst fear about parameter conguration
results to be justied ex-post. This implies that we cannot say whether the
greater volatility of macroeconomic variables (in comparison with the rational
expectation solution) represents a welfare cost ascribable to the central banks
fear about misspecication or is exactly due to the realization of the specication
errors. In other words, in the worst case model we cannot isolate the e¤ect of the
pure fear for misspecication on the policy behavior from the e¤ect of the actual
realization of a misspecicated Phillips curve7 . Hence, any comparison between
the rational expectations and the worst case model have to be taken cum grano
salis, because they are slightly di¤erent models. This is why, following Hansen
and Sargent (2004) and Leitemo and Söderström (2004a, 2004b), in order to
isolate the consequences for the economy of the fear of misspecication we need
to focus on the approximating model solution. This is found by assuming that
the central bank sets its instrument with the aim to be robust against model
misspecication but that the actual misspecication is zero.
Given the simple demand side of the model we can immediately nd the
MA(1) for the instrument rule under the worst case scenario:
mrnt =
1X
j=1
rnj t j
where the coe¢ cients rnj are given by:
rnj = 
rn
j + '
rn
j =
1  ab
a2b+ 1 jj   b
j (24)
7Equivalently we cannot say if the implementation of the optimal tarde-o¤ (which is un-
a¤ected by the preference for robustness) is indeed reached through a more or less aggressive
attitude in responding to the cost push shocks.
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the approximating model solution (indicated by the superscript a) is then ob-
tained by substituting equation (24) in the price level equation (14) setting
j = 0:
anj =
a+ 1 
j
j   b
a2b+ 1 jj   b

1 j
j + a
j
and
'anj =  
a2b+ ab 1 
j
j   b
a2b+ 1 jj   b

1 j
j + a
j
By comparing the coe¢ cients of the rational expectation and of the approx-
imating model we get:
anj   j =
b
 (1  ab)
a2b+ 1 jj   b

1
a
1 j
j + 1

a2b+ 1 jj
j ? 0 if b 7 a 1
(25)'anj  'j  =   1 jj b (1  ab)
a2b+ 1 jj   b

1 j
j + a

a2b+ 1 jj
j 7 0 if b 7 a 1
(26)
and
rn    =
b
 (1  ab)
a2b+ 1 jj   b

a2b+ 1 jj
j ? 0 if b 7 a 1 (27)
Thus, the consequence for the economy of an instrument rule sett with the
aim to be robust against model misspecication when the actual misspecication
is zero depends upon the central bank degree of conservatism. When ab < 1,
the central bank in the original rational expectation model reacts to a cost push
shock by expanding the nominal money supply (see equation (12)). In fact the
desired trade-o¤ (see equation (10)) implies that an increase in the price level
is counterbalanced by a less then proportional contraction in output, that is,
in the real money supply . On the contrary, when ab > 1, in front of a cost
push shock the central bank will destroy money in order to induce a more than
proportional output contraction. In the approximating model the central bank
tries to implement the optimal targets trade-o¤ (see equation (18)) but, due
to the concerns for model misspecication, the implied instrument rule is not
designed for the approximating model but for the worst case one. This fear
of misspecication produces an anti-attenuation result in the use of the policy
instrument: when in the original model the policy maker reacts to a cost shock
by injecting money, in the approximating model it overreacts by injecting even
more money. If the optimal policy is to tight the nominal policy instrument, in
the approximating model the nominal money reduction will be even greater (see
equation (27)). Hence, the consequences for the economy of this policy behavior
are to allow the price level (output gap) to deviate from the steady state more
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(less) than under the rational expectation model when b < a 1 and the opposite
is true when b > a 1 (see equations (25) and (26)). There is also a third case
that emerges when ab = 1. In such a situation both models produce the same
results, in fact the anti-attenaution principle cannot emerge when there is no
policy reaction in the original model, that is  = 0. This means that in this
particular parameter conguration the endogenous model trade-o¤ between the
price-level and the output gap reects exactly the desired trade-o¤ of the central
bank.
To summarize, the e¤ect of the fear of misspecication on the target variables
is not univocal. Due to the price targeting regime, the anti-attenuation principle
in the use of the policy instrument can result in a lower, in a greater or in the
same price level stabilization depending on the targets trade-o¤ in the central
bank objective function. This, in its turn, implies that an increases in the
preference for robustness causes the output gap and the reaction of the policy
instrument (price level) to be less (more) volatile when b < a 1 and viceversa
when b > a 1 as showed by the signs of the following derivatives:
@anj
@
=  
b
2

1 j
j + a

a (1  ab)h
a2b+ 1 jj   b

1 j
j + a
i2 j 7 0 if b 7 a 1
@
'anj 
@
=
b
2

1 j
j + a

(1  ab) 1 jjh
a2b+ 1 jj   b

1 j
j + a
i2 j ? 0 if b 7 a 1
@rn
@
=
  b
2
(1  ab)
a2b+ 1 jj   b
2 7 0 if b 7 a 1
All the above results are illustrated in gure 1 which shows the impulse
responses of the money supply, the price level and the output gap under the
approximating, the rational expectation and the worst case model. The graphs
in the left column are drawn under our benchmark parametrization8 and thus
b < a 1, the right hand column considers the same parametrization but with
b = 10 > a 1.
3.2 The Stackelberg Solution
Following Leitemo and Söderström (2004a) in this section we analyze a di¤erent
timing of the game and assume that the central bank, by acting as a Stackelberg
leader, designs policies taking into account the evil agents optimal decision for
8As a baseline in the whole paper, we assume a calibration that is commonly used in the
sticky information literature: a = 0:16 for the sensitivity of price to expected output gap;
(1  !) = 0:25 for the sticky information parameter; b = 0:8 for the weight assigned to the
relative price variability in the central banks objective function;  = 0:9 is the coe¢ cient of
the AR(1) process for the cost push shock. =100 is the preference for robustness.
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misspecication9 . From the previous section we know that the evil agents
reaction function is:
j =  
1 j
j
a2   1j +
1
a2   1j
by substituting it into the price level equation constraint (15) and rearranging
we get:
'j =
1
a
a2
1  a2

 1  
j
j
j + j

(28)
by minimizing the central bank loss function (7) with respect to j subject
to equation (28) we obtain the robust price coe¢ cients under the Stackelberg
timing in the worst case model, denoted by the superscript "rs":
rsj =
1 
a2 1
a2
2
a2b+ 1 jj
j (29)
using the above equation in the constraint (28) we obtain the robust output
coe¢ cients:
'rsj =  

a2 1
a2

ab 
a2 1
a2
2
a2b+ 1 jj
j (30)
Note rstly that when  ! 1 , both rsj ,'rsj collapse to the optimal ones
(see equations (8), (9)); secondly, as

a2 1
a2

 1, the robust price coe¢ cients
are always greater that the optimal ones, that is
rsj  > j , but the di¤erence
between the robust and the optimal output coe¢ cients is non-linear:
'rsj  7 'j  if 1  jj ? b
 
a2   1

given that 1 
j
j is a combination of probability that decreases over time, the
robust output coe¢ cients can be initially smaller than the optimal ones (as it
happens with our benchmark parametrization) and the opposite is true after
some periods. By comparing the Stackelberg robust coe¢ cients with the ones
obtained under the Nash timing (equations (20) and (21)) the following relations
hold: rsj  > rnj 'rsj  < 'rnj 
Thus, irrespectively of the central banks degree of conservatism, output gap
stabilization under the Stackelberg timing is greater than under the Nash timing
and the opposite is true for price level deviations. We can clarify the economic
9This alternative timing was originally suggested by Carl Walsh (see Leitemo and Söder-
ström, (2004a), footnote 10).
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mechanism that leads to this unusual result after showing the specication error
and the robust targeting rule. Using the price robust coe¢ cient in the evil
agents reaction function, the specication error under the Stackelberg timing
is:
rsj =

a2 1
a2
2
a2b
(a2   1)
 
a2 1
a2
2
a2b+ 1 jj
j
as it happens under the Nash timing, rsj is positively related with the preference
for robustness, i.e.,
@rsj
@ < 0, but after some manipulations it is easy to verify
that the rst mover advantage of the central bank leads to a lower specication
error: rsj  < rj 
This result is obtained by employing the following targeting rule, i.e., the
ratio between equations (30) and (29):
'rsj =  

a2   1
a2

abrsj (31)
The relations between the misspecication, and the output and the price
coe¢ cients are:
rsj
'rsj
=   1
a
(32)
rsj
rsj
=
a2   1
a2
b

(33)
Di¤erently from what occurs under the Nash timing, the robust trade-o¤
between the target variables (31) is now a¤ected by the preference for robust-
ness. The equivalence result does not hold because the central bank anticipates
the evil agents behavior. The relation between the specication error and the
output coe¢ cient is the same as under the Nash timing (see equations (32) and
(22)), while the ratio between the specication error and the price coe¢ cient is
now lower (see equations (33) and (23)) meaning that the central bank lets the
price level deviate from the target, due to the specication shock errors, more
than it does under the Nash timing. The same occurs for the cost push shock,
as showed by the robust targeting rule (see equations (18) and (31)).
This less aggressive attitude in stabilizing the price level irrespectively of
the degree of conservatism stems from the central bank awareness that a more
stable output gap would dampen the persistence of the inationary process
and of the shock error. Due to the Phillips curve a more stable output gap
can be achieved only by allowing the price level to absorb an higher part of
the cost push shock. The central bank foresees that the specication error is
not randomly chosen but it is "optimally" designed by the evil agent, whose
objective is to maximize the targets variability. By internalizing the evil agents
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reaction function the policy maker optimally trades-o¤ the marginal benet, in
terms of a lower specication error due to the output gap stabilization, and the
marginal cost of an higher price variability. These results are illustrated in gure
2 that shows the impulse responses of the price level, the output gap and the
specication error under both the Nash and the Stackelberg timing for a given
preference for robustness ( = 100). In the rst quarters after the shock, when
deviations from targets account more in the loss function, under the Stackelberg
timing there is a consistent gain in terms of output gap stabilization. This, in
its turn, causes a lower specication error while the price level pattern is quite
similar to the price level response under the Nash timing. After some periods
the price level exhibits higher variability, but the output gap deviations are
still smaller than under the Nash timing. Hence, the gain in terms of targets
stabilization in the rst periods after the shock more than o¤set the higher price
variability in following periods.
How can the central bank reach this result in the rst periods after the
shock? The reason lies in the dynamic properties of the SIPC. Coibion (2006)
has emphasized two features that play a key role in determining the inertial
behavior of the ination process in the sticky information model, that is, the
frequency of information updating and the degree of real rigidities. Both serve to
obtain small price adjustments in the rst periods after the shock since few rms
know the shock and their optimal price is largely una¤ected. A high degree of
real rigidities means in fact a low elasticity of the rms optimal price to expected
deviation in the output gap or, in other words, that "rms care relatively more
about the overall price level...than about.... the aggregate demand"10 . In such
a situation a central bank that foresees the evil agent behavior will put more
weight on the output gap stabilization in order to immediately dampen the
specication error without provoking a sudden increases in price level variability.
In order to fucus on the consequences for the economy of a central bank
policy action designed to be robust against model misspecication when the
actual misspecication is zero, we now solve the approximating model under
the Stackelberg timing.
The robust instrument rule in MA(1) representation is:
mrst =
1X
j=1
rsj t j
with
rsj = 
rs
j + '
rs
j =
1 

a2 1
a2

ab 
a2 1
a2
2
a2b+ 1 jj
j (34)
and thus rsj ? 0 if b 7 1a

a2 1
a2
 1
. By substituting the coe¢ cients (29), (30)
10See Coibion (2006, p. 4)
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and (34) in the price level equation without specication errors, we obtain:
asj =
a+ 1 
j
j  

a2 1
a2

a2b

1  a2 1a2


1 j
j + a
 h 
a2 1
a2
2
a2b+ 1 jj
i j
and
'asj =  

a2 1
a2

ab
h
1 j
j +

a2 1
a2

a
i

1 j
j + a
 h 
a2 1
a2
2
a2b+ 1 jj
i
By comparing the coe¢ cients of the rational expectation and of the approx-
imating model, after a tedious algebra, we obtain the following conditions:
asj   j > 0 if 0 < b < basj
asj   j < 0 if b > basj
and 'asj   'j  > 0 if b > basj'asj   'j  < 0 if 0 < b < basj
where
basj =
1
a
"
1 +

a2   1
a2
 1
1 +
1
a
1  j
j
#
given that 1 +

a2 1
a2
 1 
1 + 1a
1 j
j

> 1, when the central bank acts as a
Stackelberg leader, the range value of the degree of conservatism that allows the
emergence of an higher (lower) price level (output gap) variability is greater with
respect to the Nash one (i.e., b < 1a ). The reason is that under the Stackelberg
timing the policy maker implements a trade-o¤between the targets that stabilize
the output gap more than under the Nash timing because this policy behavior
minimizes the specication error. Hence, the consequences for the economy of
such a policy behavior are given by the interaction of two forces: On the one
hand the anti-attenuation result in the use of the nominal policy instrument
induces the central bank to react to the cost shocks in the same direction as
in the rational expectation model but with greater intensity (see the previous
section); on the other hand, and di¤erently from the Nash timing, the central
bank now seeks to implement a target trade-o¤ which depends on its preference
for robustness and it always stabilizes the output gap more than under the Nash
timing, we name this result the trade-o¤ e¤ect. To show the consequences of
this interaction, we can divide the central bank degree of conservatism in four
regions:
1. 0 < b 6 1a . When b <
1
a we know that in the rational expectation
model the central bank reacts to a cost push shock by increasing the nominal
money supply (equation (12)). Hence, under the Stackelberg timing in the
approximating model both the anti-attenuation result and the desired targets
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trade-o¤ act in the direction of increasing the policy instrument response, with
the consequence to reach a greater stabilization of the output gap, that is,
asj > 

j ,
'asj  < 'j  and rsj > j > 0 (gure 3a). When b = 1a the anti-
attenuation result does not operate because in the rational expectation model
the central bank does not react to the cost shock, but the desired trade-o¤
induces the central bank to react to the cost shock by increasing the nominal
money supply and thus we obtain again: asj > 

j ,
'asj  < 'j  and rsj > j .
2. 1a < b 6
1
a

a2 1
a2
 1
. In this region the anti-attenuation result and the
trade-o¤ e¤ect act in opposite directions. The rst e¤ect decreases the nominal
policy instrument, as in the rational expectation model we have j < 0, whereas
the trade-o¤ e¤ect leads to the opposite reaction (equation (31)). The latter
e¤ect dominates over the former, leading to higher output stabilization, i.e.,
asj > 

j ,
'asj  < 'j  and rsj 1 0 > j . When b = 1a a2 1a2  1 we get
rsj = 0, meaning that the central bank does not react to the cost shock because
the two forces (for what concerns the instrument reaction) are in exact balance.
Anyway given that j < 0 we still have 0 = 
rs
j > 

j and thus 
as
j > 

j and'asj  < 'j  (gure 3a).
3. 1a

a2 1
a2
 1
< b < basj . The anti-attenuation result and the trade-o¤
e¤ect act in opposite directions. The latter continues to dominate over the
former, that is, asj > 

j and
'asj  < 'j , but di¤erently from the previous
case, the anti-attenuation result is great enough to induce a contraction in the
policy instrument, i.e., rsj < 0. In any case, the nominal money contraction is
lower than under the rational expectation model, that is,
rsj  < j  (gure
3b).
4. b > basj . Opposite to regions 2 and 3, now the anti-attenuation result
dominates over the trade-o¤ e¤ect. Hence the policy instrument reaction (rsj <
0) is greater than under the rational expectation model, leading to an higher
price level stabilization, that is, asj < 

j ,
'asj  > 'j  and rsj  > j . When
b = basj the two models produce the same results, i.e., 
as
j = 

j and
'asj  ='j  meaning that the consequences for the economy (and not for the policy
instrument as it happens when b = 1a

a2 1
a2
 1
) of the interaction of the two
forces are exactly countervailed, i.e., rsj = 

j < 0 . It is worth to notice that
basj is not xed once and for all, but it depends from
1 j
j that is a combination
of probability that decreases over time. It is hence possible that a given degree
of conservatism falls in the the 3th region in the rst quarters after the shock
and in the 4th later on. In such a situation the trade-o¤ e¤ect dominates over
the anti-attenuation result as long as b < basj and the opposite is true when
b > basj
11 . This is the case showed in gure 3b.
11Due to the stickyness in the di¤usion of information the peak of the policy instrument
response occurs after some periods. Hence, in the rst quarters after the shock the small
(absolute) value of the policy instrument in the rational expectation model generates a mild
over-reaction (region 3) which increases over time (region 4).
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By comparing the Stackelberg robust coe¢ cients under the approximating
model with the ones obtained under the Nash timing it is easy to check that
asj > 
an
j and
'asj  < 'anj ; in both schemes we have the same anti-attenuation
result, whose sign depends upon the desired trade-o¤ in the rational expectation
model, i.e., ab ? 1. When the central bank has the rst mover advantage it
stabilizes the output gap more than under the Nash timing and this force acts
always in the same direction, leading to rsj > 
rn
j .
3.3 Welfare analysis
This section analyzes the rationale for delegating monetary policy to an inde-
pendent central banker whose preferences does not coincide with the social ones.
Since Rogo¤s (1985) contribution it is widely acknowledged that in the pres-
ence of an ination bias, produced by the policy makers desire to push output
above its natural level, the monetary authorities should be more conservative
than society in order to maximize a micro-founded social welfare function. The
sticky price New-Keynesian models reach the same conclusion, but the ratio-
nale is di¤erent. Even though in this kind of models usually there is no ination
bias, the forward looking nature of ination and the presence of a time incon-
sistency problem induce a "stabilization bias" that justies the appointment of
a conservative central banker12 .
Welfare analysis in the robust control literature is in its infancy. The existing
contributions on this topic13 consider a social planner with the same preference
for robustness as the policy maker. This assumption stems from the aware-
ness that the max-min policy problem formulation implies the hypothesis that
the policy maker and the private sector share the same reference model and
the same degree of preference for robustness. Otherwise there would be a dis-
crenpancy between the policy makers and private sectors expectations about
future ination and output. As stressed by Walsh "An interesting area for fu-
ture research would be to allow private agents and the policy maker to have
di¤erent worst-case models"14 . Even though this would enrich the analysis of
the optimal institutional design in the presence of strong uncertainty, in this
preliminary welfare analysis in a sticky information model we limit ourselves to
provide an analytical relation linking the social and the central bank degree of
conservatism with the commonly shared degree of preference for robustness.
In BMR (2005), there is neither an ination bias, since the central bank
does not have an overly ambitious output target in the objective function, nor
a stabilization bias, since the lag in the policy transmission mechanism and the
backward looking nature of the SIPC assure that the discretionary and com-
mitment solution coincide. In this context there is no rationale for appointing
a Rogo¤-conservative central banker, i.e., the social preference has to be trans-
lated into the central bankers objective function. We now wish to determine
12See Clarida et al. (1999) and Walsh (2003).
13See Kilponen (2003),Tillmann (2006) and Gaspar and Vestin (2004).
14See Walsh (2004).
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whether and how the model misspecication a¤ects this result. A micro-founded
loss function can be written in the following form:
Ls =
24 1X
j=1
'2j + b
s
1X
i=1

1
i 1
  1
i
 i 1X
j=1
2j
352 (35)
where bs is the weight society assigns to relative price variability.
Starting from the Nash timing we substitute equations (20) and (21) into
(35), and obtain the equilibrium value:
Ls =
24 1X
j=1
 
ab
a2b+ 1 jj   b
j
!2
+ bS
1X
i=1

1
i 1
  1
i
 i 1X
j=0
 
1
a2b+ 1 jj   b
j
!2352
The optimal trade-o¤ between the targets in the central bank objective func-
tion is obtained by minimizing the above expression with respect to degree of
conservativeness, i.e., the parameter b. After some algebra, we obtain the fol-
lowing relation linking the socially desired trade-o¤ (bS) with the optimal one
(brn) (see appendix A for details):
brn =

1  1
a2

bS (36)
According to equation (36), the minimization of social welfare requires the
central bank to be more populist than society; the optimal degree of conser-
vatism decreases when the preference for robustness increases. Of course under
the rationale expectation model ( !1) we have brn = bS .
How can we interpret this unconventional result? We know that the speci-
cation error is negatively related with the output gap; we also know that when
the central bank can exploit the rst mover advantage it chooses to stabilize the
output gap more then it would do under the Nash timing, i.e., when the policy
maker is not aware of the evil agents behavior. We have interpreted this result
through the central banks desire to trade-o¤ more ination variability in favor
of smaller output gap deviations, thus dampening the specication error.
The same rationale is at the basis of our delegation result. The social planner
in charge of the design of the central bank objective function, who foresees both
the behavior of the evil agent and the central bankers robust policies, in order
to minimize the specication error optimally assigns a greater relative weight on
output gap stabilization. In this sense, the social planner and the central banker
under the Stackelberg timing act in an equivalent way but through di¤erent
instruments (respectively b and the couple (pt; xt))15 . Not surprisingly, under
15This result might inspire novel interpretations for a number of stylized facts such as the
so-called Great Moderation (Bernake 2004), that is the joint reduction of output and price
volatility that occured in the 1980s. This fact contrasts with the output-price volatility
trade-o¤ which is implicit in most monetary policy models. Some authors suggest that this
volatility puzzle can be explained through a shift in the focus of monetary policy (Clarida et
al., 2000). According to this interpretation, during the 1970s the central bankersinstrument
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the Stackelberg timing there are no information advantages the social planner
could exploit and that are not considered by the central bank. By substituting
the coe¢ cients (29) and (30) in the social loss function and maximizing with
respect to b it is easy to check that the preference of the central bank must be
the same as societys (see Appendix B for details).
4 The Parametric approach
In this section we use the parametric procedure developed by Giannoni (2002)16
where the source of uncertainty is identied in one or more parameters of the
economic model. As in the unstructured approach the policy maker has multiple
priors about the distribution of the true model and he is uncertainty-adverse.
Once again, the policy maker adopts a min-max strategy which can be repre-
sented by a "mind" game played by the central bank and the ctitious "evil
agent", where the latter now controls the numerical values of the uncertain
parameters over a given domain.
In what follows we determine the robust policy rule when the central bank
is uncertain about the key parameter of the sticky information Phillips curve,
that is a, which represents the sensitivity of rms optimal price to the expected
deviation of output, and which dramatically a¤ects the dynamic properties of
the model17 . We assume that the policy maker is able to determine the maxi-
mum and the minimum value for a (i.e., a 2 (aL; aH) with aL < aH), but that
he has multiple priors about the probability distribution.
The solution procedure for this min-max problem is based on 3 steps:
Step 1. Determine the optimal coe¢ cients for known parameters, i.e., the
policy problem tackled in section 2, and obtain (8) and (9). For clarify, it is
useful to rewrite the optimal price and the optimal output gap coe¢ cients:
j =
1
a2b+ 1 jj
j
'j =  
ab
a2b+ 1 jj
j
rules did not satisfy the Taylor principle, thus leading to sunspot equilibria which exhibit high
targets volatility. By contrast, during the 1980s, more appropriate Taylor rules allowed to pin
down the volatility of both ination and output. Our nding suggests another interpretation
which does not rely on a wrong conduct of monetary policy. In our context, the preference
for robustness a¤ects both the targets volatility and the optimal trade-o¤ between targets in
the central banks loss function. A reduction in the preference for robustness decreases the
volatility of both the output gap and the price level (see equations (20) and (21)), but at
the same time increases the degree of the central bankers optimal conservatism. Hence, both
e¤ects lower the price volatility while acting in opposite direction on the output volatility.
If the reduction in the preference for robustness dominates the increase in the degree of
conservatism we obtain the Great Moderation result.
16See also Kara (2002) for an application to Clarida et al.(1999).
17See Keen (2004) and Coibion (2006).
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The optimal trade-o¤ is then:
j =  
1
ab
'j (37)
Step 2. Determine the candidate worst parameter by maximizing the loss
function with respect to a subject to the optimal coe¢ cients.
From section 2, we know that the loss function can be written as:
L ('; ; a) =
24 1X
j=1
'2j + b
1X
i=1

1
i 1
  1
i
 i 1X
j=0
2j
352 (38)
The maximization problem is:
Max
a
L ('; ; a)
s:t: j =
1
a2b+ 1 jj
j
'j =  
ab
a2b+ 1 jj
j
By substituting the constraints into the objective function and by taking the
derivative with respect to a, we obtain:
@L
@a
('; ; a) =
@'1
@a
2 +
@'2
@a
2 + :::+ b
2


1
0
  1
1

@0
@a
+ b2

1
1
  1
2

@0
@a
+
@1
@a

+
+b2

1
2
  1
3

@0
@a
+
@1
@a
+
@2
@a

+ b2

1
3
  1
4

@0
@b
+
@1
@b
+
@2
@b
+
@3
@b

+ ::
After some manipulations we get the FOC:
@L ('; ; a)
@a
=
1X
j=1
@'j
@a
2 + 
2
b
1X
j=0
1  j
j
@j
@a
= 0
By substituting the partial derivatives this becomes:
@L ('; ; a)
@a
= 2
1 
 ab
2   a3b3 
a2b+ 1 
3 21 + 2 1 22 ab2   a3b3 
a2b+ 1 22
3 22 + :::
 2b
1 
 2ab 
a2b+ 1 
3 21   2b 1 22 2ab 
a2b+ 1 22
3 22   :: =
= 2
1X
j=1
 a3b3   1 jj ab2
a2b+ 1 jj
3 2j
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In order to determine the worst parameter specication we need to study
the sign of this derivative which is composed by an innite sum of negatives
terms (remember that 1 
j
j is a combination of probabilities and all the other
parameters are positives). Hence we get:
@L ('; ; a)
@a
< 0
The central banksfear of misspecication is represented by a = aL, and the
robustly coe¢ cients are:
rj =
1
a2Lb+
1 j
j
j (39)
'rj =  
aLb
a2Lb+
1 j
j
j (40)
The robustly optimal trade-o¤ is thus:
rj =  
1
aLb
'rj (41)
Step 3. Check that the vector
 
rj ; '
r
j ; aL

is also a global Nash equilibrium
(see appendix C).
Results: Di¤erently from the HS approach under the Nash timing, the
robust trade o¤ (41) is now steeper than that without specication errors (37).
Hence, it is optimal for the policy maker to let the price level deviate from
the target (when output deviates from the natural rate) more than in the case
with known parameter18 : to interpret this, note that a low a means a worsened
price level-output trade-o¤, since the gain in terms of price stabilization of a
unit output loss is now lower. This less aggressive attitude leads to more price
variability (
@rj
@a < 0). As for output stabilization, the e¤ect of a reduction in a
is not univocal: When 1 
j
j ? a2b then
@j'rj j
@a ? 0; as
1 j
j decreases over time,
in the rst quarters after the shock we may have
'rj  < 'j  but the inequality
is the opposite after some periods.
This result is not surprising. As emphasized by Coibion (2006) and Keen
(2004), a is the key parameter in determining the inertial behavior of the target
variables. In particular, when a decreases, the largest impact of the shock occurs
with a greater delay, due to the strategic complementarity in the rmspricing
decisions. Hence, in the rst periods after the shock the robust target rule
induces a softer adjustment in the output gap.
A simple intuition for this attenuation result is the following: a positive cost
push shock leads the central bank to o¤set it trough an output contraction.
When robustness concerns on the slope of the Phillips curve are introduced the
central bank is aware that part of its e¤ort will be frustrated by the evil agents
best response (i.e., a = aL ). This reduction in the policy action e¤ectiveness
18See Kara (2002) for a similar result.
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induces the policy maker to place more weight on the target variable where the
evil agents action is less harmful, that is, output stabilization.
In the absence of uncertainty, the robust optimal trade-o¤ (41) can be repli-
cated by assigning the weight aLa b, instead of b; to the variability of relative
prices in the central banks objective function (7). In this case, a less conserv-
ative central banker (in the sense of Rogo¤, 1985) is behaviorally equivalent to
a min-maximizer central banker (that is, the optimal trade-o¤ (37) is equal to
the robust optimal trade-o¤ (41)).
5 Concluding Remarks
The analysis carried out in this paper conrms most of the results obtained in
sticky price models, including the well known fragility with respect to di¤erent
approaches to model misspecication, but also elucidates the economic mech-
anisms at play in a sticky information economy under strong uncertainty and
provides some new results which can be summarized as follows.
1 Under the HS approach, if the central bank and the evil agent act simul-
taneously, in the worst case model targets variability increases with the
preference for robustness, whereas the desired trade-o¤ between targets
is the same as in the rational expectation model: Walshs equivalence
result holds. In line with the standard interpretation, this result stems
from the central banks overestimation of the inationary consequences of
cost shocks due to its fear of misspecication. This, in its turn, causes
an higher output contraction. When the central bank wants to be robust
against specication errors but the actual misspecication is zero (the
approximating model), the robust instrument rule overreacts to the cost
shocks in the following way. When in the rational expectation model the
policy maker responds to the cost shock by injecting money (the desired
trade-o¤ implies that an increases in the price level is counterbalanced by a
less then proportional contraction in output), in the approximating model
it overreacts by injecting more money, thus leading to a greater output
stabilization. By contrast, when in the rational expectations model the
price targeting regime requires to respond to the cost shock by decreasing
money (the desired trade-o¤ implies that an increases in the price level
is counterbalanced by a more then proportional contraction in output),
in the approximating model the robust instrument rule overreacts by de-
creasing even more the money supply, thus producing a greater price level
stabilization.
2 If the central bank has the rst mover advantage, the optimal trade-o¤ be-
tween targets is a¤ected by the preference for robustness because the cen-
tral bank internalizes the evil agents behavior. In order to minimize the
specication error, the central banker, who can now exploit the trade-o¤s
between the specication error and the target variables, seeks to stabilize
the output gap at the cost of higher price variability (the trade-o¤ e¤ect).
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The consequences for the economy in the approximating model solution
depend on the interaction between the trade-o¤ e¤ect, which always acts
in the same direction, and the anti-attenuation e¤ect, which acts as in
the Nash timing. Given this interaction, there exists a range of degrees of
conservatism for which the price level stabilization is initially lower with
respect to the rational expectation model, while the opposite is true after
some periods. The explanation of the trade-o¤ e¤ect relies on the dy-
namic properties of the sticky information model, while the possibility for
the anti-attenuation e¤ect to produce either tighter or looser policies is
due to the price targeting regime adopted by the central bank.
3 Our welfare analysis suggests that, under the Nash timing, the maximization
of a micro-founded social welfare function requires to appoint a central
banker who is less conservative than society. The optimal degree of con-
servatism decreases when the preference for robustness increases. This
nding relies neither on the classical "ination bias" nor on the "stabi-
lization bias" motivations. Knowing the relation between the output gap
and the specication error, a welfare maximizer social planner assigns a
weight to the price level stabilization that is lower than that of society.
Under the Stackelberg timing, there are no information advantages the
social planner can exploit, since they are already fully considered by the
central bank; hence the policy-makers preference must be the same as
that of society.
4 Under the parametric approach (as under the Stackelberg timing in the HS
approach), the central banker is more cautious in stabilizing the price
level, since the gain in terms of price stabilization of a unit output loss is
lower than the rational expectations model. This approach leads to higher
persistency in the behaviour of the target variables since the uncertain
parameter (a), which captures the sensitivity of a rms optimal price to
the expected deviation of the output gap, plays a key role in determining
the inertial behavior of the economy.
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Appendix A
In this appendix we demonstrate the delegation result under the Nash timing
obtained in section 3. By substituting the robust coe¢ cients ((20) and (21))
into the societys loss function we obtain:
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a2b+ 1 
j
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The optimal degree of central bank conservatism is obtained by minimizing
the above expression with respect to the parameter b.
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After some manipulations we get:
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Since 11 = 1, in general notation we can write:P1
j=1
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Substituting the partial derivatives:
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that is the delegation result in the main test.
Appendix B
In this appendix we demonstrate the delegation result under the Stackelberg
timing. The equilibrium value of the loss function is:
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By minimizing with respect b:
@'rs21
@b 
2
 +
@'rs22
@b 
2
 + :::+
 
1
0   11
 @rs20
@b + b
s2
 
1
1   12
 h@rs20
@b +
@rs21
@b
i
+
+bs2
 
1
2   13
 h@rs20
@b +
@rs21
@b +
@rs22
@b
i
+ ::: = 0
After some manipulations we get:
@'rs21
@b 
2
 +
@'rs22
@b 
2
 + :::+ b
s2
 
1
0   11 + 11   12 + 12   13 + :::+ 11

+
+bs2
 
1
1   12 + 12   13 + :::+ 11
 @rs21
@b +
+bs2
 
1
2   13 + 13   14 :::+ 11
 @rs2j
@b + ::: = 0
Since 11 = 1, in general notation we can write:P1
j=1
@'rs2j
@b 
2
 + 
2
b
s
P1
j=0
1 j
j
@rs2j
@b = 0
and substituting the partial derivatives:
2
P1
j=1

a2 1
a2

ab
a2 1
a2
2
a2b+ 1 
j
j
j
24 a2 1a2 a a2 1a2 2a2b+ 1 jj   a2 1a2 2a2 a2 1a2 ab
a2 1
a2
2
a2b+ 1 
j
j
2
35 j+
 2bs
P1
j=1
1 j
j
1
a2 1
a2
2
a2b+ 1 
j
j
j

a2 1
a2
2
a2
a2 1
a2
2
a2b+ 1 
j
j
2 j = 0
By expliciting the rst two terms of the summations:
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that is the delegation result in the main text
Appendix C
In this appendix we demonstrate that the candidate min-max equilibrium 
rj ; '
r
j ; aL

found in step 3 of section 4 constitutes also a global Nash equilib-
rium. Using equation (41) we can write the price equation under the robust
targeting rule as:P1
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r
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Since this expression must hold for all possible realizations of t j , it follows
that:
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By substituting equations (41) and (42) into the objective function (38) we
get:
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In order to check if the evil agent still chooses aL, we need to study the sign
of the derivative of the above equation with respect to a:
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Expliciting the rst two terms of the summations we get: (remember that
j = (1  !)Pjk=0 !k, 1 jj = 1 !j+1!j+1 , 1 = 1):
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After some manipulations we obtain:
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Since the denominator is positive (remember that j  1), the above ex-
pression is decreasing in a; hence, in order to maximize the loss function, the
evil agent sets a = aL.
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Figure 1: Anti-attenuation result under the Nash timing
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Figure 2: Impulse resonses in the worst case model
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Figure 3a: Approximating model under Stackelberg timing
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Figure 3b: Approximating model under Stackelberg timing
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